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CONVERGENCE OF THE COMMON LAW - CIVIL LAW 
THE SCOTTISH EXPERIENCE 
Professor John Blackie, The Law School, University 
of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland 
 
 
Historical Background 
 
The Legal System in Scotland was specifically 
guaranteed a separate existence within the United 
Kingdom under a clause in the Act of Union with 
England in 1707.  By this time the law in Scotland 
had become heavily influenced in its main areas by 
the developing ius commune of continental Europe.  
Recent doctrinal legal historical research is 
beginning to reveal that this had had direct impact 
on the case law by being cited in Scottish courts,1 
and the Scottish solution, can very often be shown 
to be the adoption of one of several views that 
were current and hotly debated in contemporary or 
earlier Europe.  However, as will become more 
apparent later in this paper, it is not the 
comparison of precise legal rules or the borrowing 
                                                 
1 For particular detailed examples sHHHJ*/XEEHµ7KHIRUPDWLRQRI&RQWUDFW¶LQ.HQQHWK5HLGDQG
Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, Vol 2 ± Obligations 1 ±44 and J W g 
%ODFNLHµ'HIDPDWLRQ¶LQibid 633 ± 709. 
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and convergence of rules that should be emphasised, 
but rather a particular way of considering legal 
questions, a converged way. 
 
Accordingly, the important part of the historical 
background as influencing the mixed experience of 
the Scottish legal tradition is that it contained 
from early on works of authority by jurists that 
draw on continental as well as native Scottish, and 
then also English experience.  The first, and still 
sometimes referred to, treatise, dealing with 
virtually the whole of the Law (Stair, 
Institutions) had been published in the generation 
immediately before the Act of Union in 1707.  The 
next work of this type (Bankton, Institute) was 
written in the following generation in parts much 
under the influence of the famous Dutch jurist, 
Johannes Voet.  The result was that rules of a 
civilian origin were embedded (more often than no 
in a hidden way) in treatments that the courts 
thereafter went back to over and over again for 
major points of private law.  From around the 
middle of the eighteenth century engagement with 
doctrine of English law commenced, and ever since 
there has been a highly complex picture where 
interest in and use of English doctrines has 
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occurred along with the continued civilian 
tradition.  In civil matters, not criminal, the 
highest court is the same court as it is for 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the House of 
Lords.  There are traditionally two Scottish 
qualified judges there, occasionally, three.  As 
the bench virtually always sits with a majority of 
English qualified judges it used to be suggested by 
commentators2 that decisions of that court in 
Scottish cases had severely affected the integrity 
of the civilian tradition and resulted not so much 
in convergence as annexation by the English 
tradition.   That thesis cannot be supported.  
There are some examples where there clearly has 
been misunderstanding.3  
 
Modes of Thinking 
 
What I should like to emphasise, as a main theme, 
focussing on the position in contemporary Scotland, 
is not the fact that particular rules have a civil 
law background, nor that particular rules have an 
                                                 
2 In particular D M Walker, whose The Scottish Legal System remains the only large scale work on the 
nature of the legal system. 
3 A recent one is the case of Sharp v Thomson where alien ideas akin to those in English equity 
jurisprudence were used to hold that a buyer of immoveable property, who was not yet the owner, as 
having not yet registered his or her title, nonetheless was not affected by security in the form of a floating 
charge over the property of the bankrupt seller. 
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English background.  Rather what is important is 
that there is a particular way of thinking that has 
developed from this earlier experience.  That way 
of thinking is to think more from first principles 
in the field of law in question, rather than to at 
first look for an already decided case.  Associated 
with this is a tendency to carry on the analysis in 
that way, referring certainly to the cases, but not 
seeing them as a large collection of dicta of 
judges that have to be reconciled or exploited for 
their, often subtle, differences, which is a strong 
mark of the English common law technique.  It is 
not that this does not happen, what I am talking 
about is a tendency.   I explore this in some more 
detail below.  However, one example may make this 
clearer.  In commercial contracts a common problem 
for courts is how to deal with breach of contract 
by one party when the other party still has not 
entirely performed their side of the contract, as 
for example in a building contract where the work 
is done in stages, or in a commercial agency 
contract where the principal has to supply goods 
and information for the agent to get business.  In 
all the recent Scottish decisions the court has 
started by emphasising the principle of 
µµmutuality¶¶ underlying contract law and then 
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determining on the facts what in the particular 
contract were the counterpart obligations of each 
aspect of the contract.4 
 
:KHQFDQ\RXERUURZRWKHUSHRSOH¶VFDVHODZ" 
 
The experience of a mixed legal system, at least 
that of Scotland, which has developed in very close 
proximity to English law, as has that of South 
Africa, is that taking guidance from the case law 
of the common law world, can be done from a 
background of civilian rules and also the distinct 
way of thinking from first principles, that is 
outlined above.    The experience of Scotland over 
the last century and more, I believe, shows both 
the advantages and the pitfalls that are entailed 
by such a development.  It also shows that there 
are certain features of a legal system, which 
probably are quite deeply embedded, that result in 
certain areas of law as quite resistant to such a 
development.   To take this last point first:  It 
is well known to comparative lawyers and legal 
policy makers that the law of immoveable property 
is typically very resistant to influence from other 
                                                 
4 For a detailed study of the interaction of civilian and English common law in the Scots law of contract, 
6HH+/0DF4XHHQµ6FRWVDQG(QJOLVK&RPPRQ/DZ7KH&DVHRI&RQWUDFW¶&XUUHQW/HJDO
Problems 205. 
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systems of law.  The Scottish experience shows that 
the law of succession on death is likewise 
resistant.  But it is not so obvious why that 
should be so.  One can contrast the law relating to 
interpretation of terms of contracts and the law 
relating to interpretation of terms of wills.  In 
interpreting terms of contracts the courts in 
Scotland frequently use English material, though 
one can discern occasionally some civilian maxim, 
such as the approach to construing ambiguities 
where they restrict freedom contra proferentem, as 
in an exemption from liability clause.  Cases on 
interpreting wills virtually never refer to English 
material, even though the approach in both 
countries is in essence the same.  In interpreting 
contracts the latest English fashions are picked up 
eagerly and quickly.  A prominent example is the 
µµfactual matrix¶¶ i.e. contextual, approach to 
interpretation of contracts associated with Lord 
Hoffmann.5 
 
 
Convergence Driven by a Perception of Common 
Economic and Social Change 
 
                                                 
5 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [998] 1 WLR 896. 
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Generally 
 
One trend that is promoting convergence between 
civil law traditions and the English tradition at 
present is that Courts, and jurists are 
increasingly aware that a developing relatively 
globalised economy and society is throwing up new 
challenges and it is seen as appropriate for the 
law to respond to these either in the same way in 
different jurisdictions, or, if that cannot be 
achieved, at least in the light of consideration of 
the same factors.  The difficult questions that 
medical technologies pose for the law are a fairly 
obvious example of this.  Examples of this can be 
found in courts in a variety of jurisdictions, now 
dating back into the 1980s.  The German Supreme 
Court made use of English material in a decision in 
a µµwrongful life¶¶ claim as long ago now as 1986.6   
This tendency to convergence when faced with what 
are seen as new social and economic phenomena does 
not necessarily result in there being a common 
outcome in all jurisdictions.  It has not, for 
example, in the field of wrongful life claims. 
However, there is a tendency to strive for that.  A 
particularly marked example in the Scottish 
                                                 
6 BGHZ 86,240. 
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experience, in a House of Lords case as it happens7 
is the finding that a woman, guaranteeing her 
KXVEDQG¶VEXVLQHVVGHEWVWRDEDQNLVHQWLWOHGWR
avoid the contract of guarantee8 with the bank, on 
the ground that the relationship with her husband 
was a form of misrepresentation by a third party 
giving rise to this right.  It is fairly clear that 
on the authorities this was not part of the Law of 
Scotland.  But convergence was achieved not by 
crude annexation through simply relying on English 
case law.  Rather, it was, in the most influential 
judgement, recast in what sounds like a civil law 
mode, by reference to a requirement on the part of 
the bank of µµgood faith¶¶, and supporting that by 
reference to a number of Scottish decisions which 
were nothing to do with good faith in creation of 
contracts, but were to do with good faith 
controlling the acquisition of property rights.  
Such property rights cases deal with situations 
such as that where the owner of something has 
entered into a binding contract to sell it to 
someone and then before the date for performing 
that contract arrives sells it to someone else and 
makes that person the owner, in a situation where 
                                                 
7 Smith v Bank of Scotland 9997 SC (HL) 111. 
8 5HIOHFWLQJWKHFLYLOLDQWUDGLWLRQWKH6FRWWLVKOHJDOZRUGLV³FDXWLRQ´ 
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that person knew or turned a blind eye to the 
existence of the first contract.9 
 
Human Rights 
 
An overarching legal order as Human Rights law 
under the European Convention of Human Rights has 
in the short period that it has been embedded in 
the laws of the United Kingdom jurisdictions shown 
that it can play a role in the experience of 
convergence.  This is a distinctive feature, the 
relative importance of which, it may be predicted, 
will grow greater in this.  What is obviously 
distinctive about it is that it is set of ideas and 
doctrines, but, even more crucially, a way of 
looking at issues and disputes that arises from 
within neither the civilian tradition as such nor, 
of course, from the English tradition.  It is clear 
that it draws on a much wider worldwide movement.  
It happens that owing to the coming about of 
Scottish political devolution before the Human 
Rights Act 1998 came into force, and the effect of 
a specific clause in the legislation that created 
                                                 
9 .QRZQWR6FRWVODZ\HUVDV³RI-VLGHJRDOV´FDVHVUHIOHFWLQJDIRRWEDOOLQJPHWDSKRULQWKHMXGJHPHQWVLQ
the leading case, Rodger (Builders) v Fawdry 1950 SC 483. 
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the new constitutional arrangements in Scotland10 
that the first Human Rights cases in the United 
Kingdom were cases in Scotland.  They in turn have 
been influential in the development of the human 
rights jurisprudence of the English courts as 
well.11  More important for the experience of 
convergence than the fact that the same issues and 
the same rules become prominent may be that a 
common way of thinking is increasingly fostered.  
This may be more marked for England than for 
Scotland, since, as suggested above Scots lawyers 
can be shown, to have a tendency to think more from 
first principles, than from looking for a case.  
Human Rights law always starts from a principle, in 
this case in the European Convention. 
 
One area where this may prove to have affected the 
mode of thinking is those aspects of the law where 
private law12 gives protection to µµprivacy¶¶.  A 
series of cases in England in the last year,13 
considering Article 8 (private and family life) and 
Article 10 (Freedom of expression) have developed 
                                                 
10 Scotland Act 1998. 
11 For example in the field of Mental Health law the case of X v Scottish Ministers which held that the first 
ever statute of the Scottish Parliament, an Act which in effect meant that people who had been sent to 
mental hospital by a criminal court, but turned out not to be treatable, could be detained in hospital. 
12 As opposed to a statutory regime such as the protection from harassment legislation 
13 Most recently Campbell v MGN Ltd [2002] EWCA 1373. 
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the native common law of breach of confidence to 
cover classic inappropriate media intrusion.  There 
has been no Scottish case so far on the topic, 
though there are dicta in a range of Scottish 
decisions from before the European Convention being 
incorporated into the domestic law, that Scots law 
does give µµprotection of privacy¶¶.  It can be 
predicted if such a case does emerge, that the 
court may well not proceed solely as the English 
have in developing µµbreach of confidence¶¶.  That 
concept is part of Scots law, having been 
independently created, without direct reference to 
English law, by Scottish judges from the early 
nineteenth century onwards, to deal firstly with 
lawyer/client confidentiality, and, then, to do 
deal with medical confidentiality, and later trade 
secret confidentiality.  But much of the 
conceptualisation will be very similar to that 
adopted recently in the confidentiality cases. 
 
When convergence is taking a cross bearing 
 
I have emphasised some factors from a Scottish 
perspective within the United Kingdom and more 
widely which do seem to be driving some 
convergence.  However, one should not assume always 
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that because there is an interest in material from 
another legal tradition, and, indeed, direct 
reference to it that that is evidence of genuine 
convergence.  If the background of the particular 
system is relatively resistant to outside 
influence, which seems to be the case with English 
law, but much less with Scots law, and especially 
given the casuistic technique adopted by English 
law it can be that use of material is a basic way 
of checking in a situation where the law is faced 
with a real difficulty that the solution locally is 
not out of line with the thinking of other parts of 
the world.  Professor Sejf van Erp discusses a very 
recent prominent example of this in an English case 
in the House of Lords in detail in his essay in 
this collection.14  The importance of this type of 
development is, clearly, of great significance for 
understanding convergence now and as it will 
develop.  It is a different phenomenon from the 
purely ornamental references to foreign systems 
that in the past can be found on occasions in 
Scottish material.15 
 
                                                 
14 EDITOR PLEASE ADD A CROSS REFERENCE TO THIS 
15 For these see E gUFµ&RPSDUDWLYH/DZDVD7ROORI&RQVWUXFWLRQWKH6FRWWLVK&RXUWV¶
-XULGLFDO5HYLHZDQG-:*%ODFNLHµ2OGDQG)RUHLJQ+LVWRU\+LVWRULRJUDSK\DQG&RPSDUDWLYH
/DZ¶LQ/LQGVD\)DUPHUDQG6FRWWVeitch (eds), The State of Scots Law (2001). 
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Potential Dangers 
 
It is perhaps, however, worth noting that Scottish 
experience shows that it can happen that there can 
be a complete misunderstanding of the other 
V\VWHP¶VDSproach, if the court is not sufficiently 
informed about the position in that other system.  
Amongst many successful uses of British 
Commonwealth material by Scottish courts can be 
found a few instances where it has been 
misunderstood, through using a secondary source and 
not discovering the latest position in the legal 
system borrowed from.  In one case a decision of 
the Australian High Court was used to support a 
finding that if a passenger was injured when being 
driven by someone whom he or she knew did not have 
a licence there could be no award of damages.  By 
the time of the Scottish decision the Australian 
Court had, some years, before not followed its 
earlier decision and had developed a more subtle 
approach involving consideration of community 
acceptability, which has since been followed in 
Scotland. 
 
Law Reform and Political Autonomy 
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Attempts to discuss the developing relationship 
between the civilian tradition and the English law 
tradition miss a large part of the reality of law 
LQWRGD\¶VZRUOGLIthey do not consider what has 
occurred as a result of conscious law reform.  As 
far as Scotland and England and Wales (separately 
from Scotland) are concerned, very large areas of 
private and commercial law have in the last forty 
years been created by legislation promoted by 
permanent law reform bodies (the Law Commission of 
England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission).  
In Scotland it looks as though the establishment 
two years ago of the new constitutional 
arrangements whereby there is an autonomous 
Scottish Parliament, with power to legislative for 
all of private law, and large parts of commercial 
law,16 FDQEHVHHQDVJLYLQJDERRVWWRWKLV,W¶V
first major piece of legislation17 was a completely 
new comprehensive code dealing with decision making 
for adults with partially diminished or complete 
lack of capacity to make decisions, that had been 
promoted by the Scottish Law Commission.  It is 
currently engaged on what will be a completely new 
code of land law, again based on detailed work of 
                                                 
16 The major exception is company law.  But that anyhow is increasingly driven by European Union 
legislation. 
17 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. 
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the Scottish Law Commission over very many years.  
Law reform coming from other quarters has also been 
facilitated.  The most notable example is a bill 
before the Scottish Parliament to recast completely 
the law relating to Mental Health18 
 
Even before the Parliament was created conscious 
law reform proposals, resulting in legislation over 
the last forty years have produced a distinctive, 
but also completely new set of rules for Scotland 
in, to mention only the most prominent areas:  
bankruptcy, the enforcement of debts against 
GHEWRUV¶DVVHWVIDPLO\/DZDQGSUHVFULSWLRQRI
obligations.  Fully to understand what might be the 
nature of convergence and divergence between the 
civilian and the English tradition, does entail 
considering this sort of new law, which is in fact 
extremely central to the experience of most, if not 
quite all,19 legal systems in the western world 
today.  It promotes convergence by two routes:  
firstly, law reform bodies for much of the time 
work by identifying µµproblem¶¶ and proposing 
µµsolutions¶¶.  That fits naturally into one 
particular approach to do doing comparative law, in 
                                                 
18 Following the recommendations of a committee set up by the Scottish Executive to consider the field. 
19 Even Germany has now finally achieved a reform of aspects of Schuldrecht. 
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which the rules of other legal systems are then 
searched as ways of providing the optimum solution 
to problems.  It is much less common in this sort 
of work to look for underlying conceptual 
structures.  One possible example where that might 
have happened was if the Scottish Law Commission 
had, as a few years ago it looked as though it 
wished to, undertaken a complete reworking of the 
law of unjustified enrichment for Scotland.  The 
second respect in which the work of Law Reform 
bodies is important for understanding the way 
convergence does and does not take place is that 
much of this sort of law is completely independent 
invention.  For example, the form of security that 
has to be adopted for securing a loan over 
immoveable property in Scotland is a statutory 
creation from the early 1970s that bears no 
relationship to the previous modes of constituting 
security over immoveables.  It has, incidentally, 
given rise to some litigation as to just what 
rights and duties it creates.  Prominently, the 
system of bankruptcy for individuals and 
partnerships, which in its modern form dates from 
198520 is in important respects a completely new 
system using ideas, e.g. in determining the range 
                                                 
20 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985. 
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of alienations prior to insolvency that can be 
challenged that draws on no other tradition, and 
only to a limited extent on earlier Scottish 
tradition. 
 
The Effect of the development of Law defined by 
context 
 
There have always been recognised areas of law that 
are defined not by reference to their legal rules 
but by a context.   Banking Law, and also Labour 
Law are, for instance, terms that have now a long 
history.  However, there is a development taking 
place where new areas are beginning to become 
prominent where the context is the defining idea.   
One of these at least is global; the law of 
internet and telecommunications law as well.  
Another is global in a different way, because the 
context is one of potentially global and certainly 
transnational effect, Environmental Law.   Another, 
which is more nationally based but has 
transnational dimensions, is Media Law.  Another, 
which is not transnational in its effect, but is in 
the technology that underlies at least large 
projects, is the law of the building industry, 
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Construction Law.21  All these areas in different 
ways, are already I believe promoting some 
convergence between civilian and common law 
traditions.  Scotland is a fruitful vantage point 
from which to observe the process taking place.  In 
many of these areas the question of convergence 
will increasingly show itself through legislation.  
This has already happened for instance on a UK 
basis in the construction industry where 
legislation in 199622 introduced a new type of 
mandatory mechanism23 for resolving disputes of the 
type that occur often during the performance of 
construction contracts, for example, disputes 
between sub-contractors and main contracts, about 
when the sub-contractor is entitled to be paid.  
Environmental law is increasingly based on 
legislation, much of it reflecting international 
conventions.  Human Rights law increasingly 
dominates Media Law.  Scotland, as already noted 
above, shows that there may be room for genuine 
development, for example in privacy, and the law of 
contempt of court from background of being a mixed 
jurisdiction. 
                                                 
21 For a discussion the wider European (including UK) context See C. E. C. Jensen, Towards a European 
Building Contract Law (1999). 
22 Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996. 
23 &DOOHG³DGMXGLFDWLRQ´ 
 19 
 
 
Civilian Systems Rediscover their solutions through 
Scotland 
 
I have tried to be careful not to suggest that a 
mixed legal system in the form that the Scottish 
one has is by definition the model for the future 
in Europe or the world more widely.  But there are 
aspects of the current experience in Scotland that 
can be pointed to as some sort of inspiration that 
fits the philosophy of the Hansa law School.  They 
are: 
 
x %HLQJRSHQWRRWKHUODZ\HUV¶DSSURDch to legal 
questions 
 
x Seeking to think from first principles in 
addressing a situation requiring a legal 
solution 
 
x Not being frightened by terminology of another 
system 
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x Being careful to go beneath the surface to see 
that sometimes there really is a major 
difference of thinking and/or approach 
 
x Having a confidence that small legal systems 
may have things to offer that are at least as 
fruitful as those of large legal systems 
 
x Being aware that the experience of becoming a 
mixed legal system is diverse, complex and can 
be difficult 
 
 
Two examples may be used from recent Scottish 
experience to illustrate all of these points.  The 
recent final publication of the Principles of 
European Contract Law24 in many respects happen to 
reflect the structure of the Scottish law of 
contract, in particular its approach to contract 
breach, based on a recognition of the principle of 
mutuality and treating the right to performance as 
being primary and its approach to contract 
formation based on objective assessment of 
consensus with a defined role for unilateral 
                                                 
24 Prepared by the Commission of European Contract Law, Chairman Professor Ole Lando, (Ole Lando and 
Hugh Beale (eds) Parts I and II (2000). 
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promises and third party rights.  Work by a number 
of academic authors25 has shown that Scotland has a 
series of principles underlying a law of trusts, 
which do not rely on nor need English equity 
jurisprudence, and which can be adapted to the 
experience of European jurisdictions which do not 
on the face of them have a unified law of trusts.  
The structure is remarkably simple, based on a 
concept of the trustee(s) having a split 
personality, and the beneficiaries having a complex 
of personal rights against the trustees, with the 
split personality meaning that these do not run the 
risk of being nullified in practice by the 
bankruptcy of the trustee(s).  There is controversy 
as to just exactly what the correct juristic basis 
for analysing the split personality of the trustee 
is.  The dominant view is based on the civilian 
idea of distinct patrimonies (French = patrimoine); 
others have suggested that some sort of distinct 
status relationship exists. 
 
A Final Warning 
 
                                                 
25 Especially George Gretton, Edinburgh University.  The literature is now growing with also contributions 
by K G Reid,  S Wortley, N Whitty, J W G Blackie and others. 
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There is at least one danger apparent from Scottish 
experience of drawing on different legal 
traditions.  It is probably enough to just be aware 
of it, so as not to end on a too negative note.  
The danger is getting lost.  The law of delict in 
Scotland can be criticised on this basis.   The Law 
of negligence is in essence a UK developed area of 
law that is entirely case law based, and now 
drawing heavily on influence from British 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, even though in some 
respects, such as the liability of public 
authorities, e.g. for negligent environmental 
planning decisions, there is divergence on the part 
of Canada and New Zealand.  But the rest of the law 
of delict in Scotland lacks any proper structure.  
Sometimes it can be shown to be because of a 
failure to grapple with the big questions simply 
because it does not know where it stands on them.  
One example is where a government official does 
something intentionally knowing that it will cause 
a detriment to a member of the public, and it is 
some way µµillegal¶¶.  When some fifteen years ago 
a charterer of an oil tanker alleged that the 
public officer who controlled the harbour at Sullom 
Voe in Shetland had intentionally refused the ship 
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entry without legal ground,26 the Scottish Court 
looked at a Scottish textbook that happened to 
mention that England there was something called the 
µµtort of misfeasance in a public office¶¶, and on 
the back of that raided some English case law, and 
said the English rules would apply.  That required 
that there was shown to be some actual personal 
VSLWHPRWLYDWLRQWKHSXEOLFRIILFHU¶VDFWLRQV7KH
trouble for Scots law is that it leaves the rest of 
the law of intentional delict lacking any 
structure, without having noticed that in England 
they have many other torts dealing with specific 
sorts of intentional tort, and do not so obviously 
need a general structure for that area of law. 
 
All good things have risks and dangers in them.  
That is no reason for not involving oneself in the 
whole heartedly. 
 
                                                 
26 Micosta SA.v Shetlands Islands Council (The Mihalis) 1986  SLT 193. 
